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Scott: What Role Is There for Independent Directors of Mutual Funds

What Role Is There for
Independent Directors of Mutual

Funds?
Kenneth E. Scott*
What do mutual fund independent directors' do? What
can reasonably be expected of them?
I. MONITORING

Independent directors of mutual funds in a typical retail
complex are monitors of the management company, which
is a separate organization. The directors monitor
investment performance, shareholder service and total
costs. They also monitor the level of risk created by the

management of the portfolio.
Focusing on the management fee is not particularly wellconceived. Directors should be focusing on total cost for
total performance. To perform that role, a director needs to
be able to do rather objective measurements of

performance, both in service and in terms of portfolio. The
* Kenneth E. Scott is the Ralph M. Parsons Professor of Law and
Business Emeritus at Stanford Law School. He is also an independent
director, American Century Funds and Dresdner RCM Capital Funds.
This text is taken from remarks by Professor Scott at the SEC
Roundtable on the Role of Independent Investment Company Directors
(February 23, 1999).
'The roles of independent mutual fund directors and of directors of
corporations differ in at least three ways. First, there are differences in
the legal frameworks that apply and in the structures of the positions,
that result in mutual fund independent directors potentially being in a
stronger legal position. Second, the mutual fund business is, relatively
speaking, a narrower product line than most businesses. I think it is
possible for independent directors, either initially or over time, to have a
better grasp of the business than is true probably for the directors of a
great many large New York Stock Exchange-type companies. The third
distinction though cuts the other way. To some degree there are large
stockholders of New York Stock Exchange companies who can play
significant roles in the corporate governance of those firms, either
directly through contact with management or by taking positions in
proxy contests or takeover bids. There is no counterpart in the mutual
fund world.
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issue is the role of the director in pushing to get objective
measurements of costs in relation to quality of service and
of returns in relation to risk.
There is a lot of attention paid to total returns. The
treatment of risk, both in prospectuses and I suspect
sometimes internally in the complexes, is much cruder.
The challenge lies in devising appropriate benchmarks
that include measures for both return and risk, and
monitoring the performance of the fund managers with
respect to the benchmark and also with respect to
adherence to the risk levels that are implied by the
benchmark. 2 Bar graphs as a measure of volatility or risk
are a very primitive way to go about this.
On objectively measuring costs, it is costs in relation to
what? It is in relation to, among other things, the size of
the fund and the size of the complex. What some of the
boards on which I serve have been doing internally for
several decades is following a regression methodology 3 to
try to establish a cost benchmark that is sensitive to the
particulars of the cost environment and can serve as a
basis for evaluating cost performance or setting an
expense cap.
HI. BARGAINING
The second part of this task, though, is what do you do
with the measurements, assuming you have the data
(which are usually not difficult to obtain), and have found
an appropriate way to measure them. The standard
answer is that the independent directors are supposed to
use the information derived from their measurements to
act on behalf of shareholders when renewing the
2

Setting a benchmark means choosing some published index or
target portfolio, whose returns (and their variance) can be compared to
those of the fund.
Regression analysis is a mathematical technique for using industry
data to determine the extent to which a dependent variable (for
example, fund operating costs) is explained by certain other factors (for
example, complex size, fund size, average account size, etc.).
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management contract.4 And here I think there are two
concepts of the role of the board that have never really
been sorted out or very clearly distinguished.
Are independent directors supposed to be there as a line
of defense against management gross overreaching or
management failure, a safeguard against the extremes, or
are they supposed to be there as arm's-length bargaining
representatives on behalf of the shareholders? Those are
the polar positions; obviously, there could be intermediate
positions along the continuum.
The minimal concept of the role of the independent
directors on the board is that they are there to keep the fee
"reasonable." They are an outer check on the management
company. The greater check, because this is a competitive
industry, is in the marketplace. But the independent
directors serve as a secondary kind of check. And,
therefore, you5 invoke things like the business
judgment rule.
The stronger concept is that the independent directors
are there to be independent bargaining agents for the
shareholders. It has never been completely clear that is
really the Securities and Exchange Commission's view of
what the Investment Company Act 6 is all about.
Here you have to distinguish between a standard of
conduct and a standard of liability. The standards of
personal liability for directors clearly are duty of care,
gross negligence, the business judgment rule, that kind of
thing. The conduct norm for which the Investment
Company Act seems to be striving is that the independent
directors are truly independent directors - they are not
like interested persons of the adviser making defensible
business judgments. That is what the statute appears to
4

Another answer is to increase disclosure of some of the
measurements. For more discussion of this option, see Part Ill, infira.
5
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. Supp. 1984).
6 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq. (1999) ("Investment Company Act").
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have in mind. 7 However, there has never really been a
consensus in the industry or at the Commission on the
matter.
The conclusion I think that some might draw from
recent cases like Yacktman and Navelier 8 is that you
cannot be an independent director - you may be a
disinterested director, but you are not an independent
director - if you are subject to removal by the
management company. Independence is a question not of
the amount of fees or director compensation. 9
Independence is a reflection of how you got on the board
and how can you be taken off the board. Who puts you
there and who keeps you there? Who can push you off? If
the answer to those questions is the management
company, then you are not independent of the
management company. And if you are not independent of
the management company, the notion that you can act
effectively in an arm's-length bargaining capacity, vis-a-vis
the management company, is silly.
This is not to say that the outsiders on the board do not
in most cases have a certain amount of clout that they can
use. I think probably we have all experienced that. The
amount of clout independent directors have is a function
of institutional factors, such as what the law says is the
7

Section 15(c) of the Investment Company Act requires contracts
between an open-end investment company and its investment adviser
and principal underwriter to be approved "by the vote of a majority of
directors, who are not parties to such contract or agreement or
interested persons of any such party ... ." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1999).
Section 2(a)(19)(B) of the Act lists those categories of persons who are
considered to be interested persons of an investment adviser or
principal underwriter. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(B) (1999).
8The Yacktman and Navellier situations involved clashes between
independent directors and fund investment advisers. In both situations
independent directors who questioned how the investment adviser was
operating a mutual fund were successfully ousted by management. See
David A. Sturms, Enhancing the Effectiveness of Independent Directors:
Is the System Broken, Creaking or Working?, 1 VILL. J.L. & INV. MGMT.
103, 109-111 (1999).
9The focus on director compensation is a kind of misdirection. It
fascinates Barrons and the Wall Street JournaL I don't think it should be
the focus of people who think seriously about these matters.
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percentage of outside directors or the process by which
vacancies are filled.10
At the outset in a new complex and a new fund obviously
the directors are chosen by management. There should be
no illusions about that. But then if they are, indeed, of a
mind to be independent, or independence develops over
time, that tie to the initial source of appointment becomes
attenuated. People change, management turns over,
directors turn over, new people come in. I think as a
sociological matter (not that I know a study has ever been
done) you would expect to see that over time there would
be a growing degree of independence - and, after all, it is a
matter of degree and not all or nothing.
If the individual board members have an attitude of
independence, how far can they push it? Navellier and
Yacktman suggest that there are limits as to how far they
can push it. But note that those limits, nonetheless, give
independent directors quite a bit of potential bargaining
power, because in both cases although the independent
directors lost,1" the fight was costly to the funds. 2 They
shrank enormously in assets.' 3 So, again, independent
The Securities and Exchange Commission has recently proposed "a
10
number of rule and form changes to enhance the independence and
effectiveness of fund boards of directors" with a particular emphasis on
the role of independent directors. Among the proposed changes are
proposals to require the following: (i) that, under ordinary
circumstances, either a majority or a super-majority of a fund's board of
directors be independent; (ii) that, to the extent permitted by state law,
independent directors nominate and select new independent directors;
and (iii) that, if the board has counsel, the counsel be independent of
management. Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies,
Investment Company Act Release No. 24,082, at *5 (Oct. 14, 1999), 64
Fed. Reg. 59,826. at 59,829 (Nov. 3. 1999).
1 It was not too surprising that independent directors lost. The
shareholders knew the name on the fund, not the names of the
independent directors.
12 Of course, the fight was also costly to the independent directors or
defendants in the lawsuits.
13According to a Post-Effective Prospectus Amendment filed by the
Navellier Aggressive Small Cap Equity Portfolio on May 1. 1998, its
assets declined from approximately $190 million at the end of 1996 to
$73 million at the end of 1997. 485BPOS filed by the Navellier
Aggressive Small Cap Equity Portfolio (CIK 906518) on May 1, 1998,
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directors have to make nuanced judgments about the
degree of their clout and decide which situations warrant
trying to actually make use of it. But is there some
bargaining power if the directors are sufficiently
independent in attitude that they want to use it? You
know, of course, there is.
I. FOSTERING COMPETITION

If you assume a competitive market, then what is the
role of the independent director? I think it is quite a limited
role. But first, how competitive is the market and what are
the limits of competition? Then, what can or should
independent directors do to encourage competition and
informed choice?
A competitive market works through customers
switching. If I switch from one brand of peanut butter to
another brand of peanut butter, I do not have a very high
switching cost. The transaction cost is pretty low. Even if I
am switching from one automobile to another automobile,
my investment in the automobile I have is running down
over time. I can probably make a relatively low cost
transition, as I get to the point where I want to buy a new
car anyway.
What is the measure of transaction cost in switching in
the mutual fund industry, in this kind of product? It is not
almost zero, as it is with the peanut butter. The transition
cost is partly an information cost and that gets us into the
realm of disclosure. It is partly, because of the way the
market has performed in the last half-dozen to a dozen
years, the cost of realizing all of the deferred capital gains
and incurring the taxes that a shareholder could trigger by
deciding to switch. Is that a full lock-in? No. Is it in some
instances a significant transition transaction cost? Yes.
SEC Document Number 19980504. Similarly, Yacktman Fund assets
declined from approximately $1,080 million at the end of 1997 to $307
million at the end of 1998. Form 497 filed by The Yacktman Fund (CIK
885980) on May 10. 1999, SEC Document Number 1990511.
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With peanut butter as with most products, what I am
buying, what the price tag tells me I am going to get, is
already there. It is in the jar. When you buy a mutual fund,
you are not buying something in the jar. You are buying
some future expectations. You are buying future
performance. That means that determining comparability
is far, far more difficult than when we are talking about
peanut butter or automobiles. It is within the margin of the
transaction cost in switching, it seems to me, that you are
exploring whether or not the independent director can
make a difference in terms of the factors that bear on your
decision to switch.
What can be done to assist people in making a decision
about switching and to assist people in general in knowing
what they are buying when they buy a mutual fund? The
data we get in the prospectus are all historical data,
backward looking. They answer the question: what did the
fund do in stated past periods? To the extent that the past
is a good predictor of the future which, of course, every
prospectus denies, and which every investor disregards, it
does have some value.
But what do you do internally within a complex in
looking at the performance of your portfolio managers?
You generally do not reward them on the basis of what
they did two or three years ago. In the complex with which
I am most familiar, what the independent directors look at
are the benchmarks that they have established for the
manager and how the manager performs with respect to
those benchmarks in the time periods to come. If that is
what makes sense for the management company and
independent directors - how is the portfolio manager
doing vis-d-vis his bogey - would you not think that
would be the kind of information that would be even more
relevant to investors than how this manager or some other
manager did in times past with respect to this or some
other benchmark or bogey? I would think that forwardlooking disclosure would actually be of greater
investor value.
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This is not to suggest that the prospectus should predict
how the fund will do the next year. That is beyond us all.
All I am saying is that internally we look at, and externally
I presume one could disclose, an existing fact. What is the
benchmark in relation to which this manager is trying to
manage this fund? The benchmark or the strategy may
change in the future, if there is a decision to do so, but
disclosure of the current benchmark is disclosure of a fact.
IV. CONCLUSION
What do the independent directors of mutual funds do?
They set goals for management. They monitor the
performance of management vis-A-vis those goals. They
act at least as an outer check on management. What else
could they do? They could disclose the benchmarks that
they use to evaluate management. Such disclosure might
also enhance the competitiveness of the market, indirectly
promoting a more effective check on management than the
independent directors alone can otherwise provide.
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